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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF ROY, 
a Public Agency, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
KEITH S. JONES, AND 
LORIS M. JONES, 
Defendants-Appellants 
Supreme Court No. 20517 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an eminent domain case brought by the Redevelopment 
Agency of Roy (hereinafter "RDA" or "Agencv") to condemn 
the property of Keith S. Jones and Loris M. Jones (formerly 
spouses) located in Roy, Utah. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried before a jury with the Honorable 
John F. Wahlquist, District Judge, presiding, which resulted 
in a jury verdict of just compensation and a judgment on 
the verdict of $128,000 (R.113) and reasonable moving 
expenses to the Defendant-Appellant, Loris M. Jones of 
$18,300. (Mr. Jones made no claim for relocation or 
moving expenses). Subsequent to the trial, Loris M. Jones 
made a Motion pursuant to UTAH CODE ANNO. § 11-19-23.9 for the 
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Court to award reasonable attorney's fees. Said Motion 
was denied. Mrs. Jones appeals from both the jury verdict 
and the Court's denial of an award of attorney's fees. 
Mr. Jones has not joined in the Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED UNSUPPORTED 
OPINION TESTIMONY AS TO THE SIZE OF THE SUBJECT 
PROPERTY AND PROPERLY JUDICIALLY NOTED TO THE 
JURY A MATHEMATICAL COMPUTATION AS TO THE 
POSSIBLE SIZE OF SAID PROPERTY. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT REFUSE TO ALLOW 
EVIDENCE OF PROPER MOVING EXPENSES AS TO 
APPELLANT - BUT DID PROPERLY EXCLUDE MOVING 
COSTS OF NON-PARTIES (ADULT-EMANCIPATED CHILDREN). 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS 
DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO ALLOW ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND SUCH AN AWARD WOULD NOT BE PROPER 
UNDER THE RELOCATION ACT. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On October 19, 1982, the RDA passed and adopted a 
resolution authorizing the acquisition by condemnation of 
the subject property for inclusion within a Redevelopment 
Project. (Exhibit "B" to Complaint R.6). The subject property 
was described as Exhibit D (R.IO) to the Complaint as follows: 
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The land referred to is in the State of Utah, County of 
Weber and is described as follows: 
Part of the Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter 
of Section 13, Township 5 North, Range 2 West, Salt 
Lake Meridian, U.S. Survey: Beginning at a point 869.2 
feet North and 383 feet East and South 70.3 feet from 
the Southwest corner of the Northwest Quarter of said 
Southwest Quarter Section; running thence North 36°30f 
West 97.07 feet, more or less, to the East line of 
Highway; thence Southwesterly along said East line to a 
point North 89°15f East of a point 683.2 feet North of 
said Southwest corner of Northwest Quarter of Southwest 
Quarter Section; thence North 89°15' East 281 feet, 
more or less, to a point 409 feet North 89°15f East of 
the West line of said Southwest Quarter Section; thence 
North 10°40f West 108.2 feet; thence North 36°30f West 
11.93 feet to the place of beginning. 
Said description is identical to that contained in the 
Warranty Deed through which the Jones obtained title to the 
property. (Exhibit 22D.) The description does, however, 
contain a flaw in that it does not precisely close and must 
be "forced" to closure, (R.426-27, 432-33) but by doing so 
the square footage could be altered only in "...a minor 
amount ... maybe ten square feet ..." (R.432.) 
Prior to the Condemnation Resolution above-described, 
the RDA on September 17, 1982 made an "offer to purchase" 
the subject property (using the above description thereof) 
for the sum of $150,000. (Exhibit
 f23D.) The offer was 
never accepted by Jones, but, likewise, was never withdrawn 
or terminated by the RDA. 
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During their case-in-chief, the Jones called as an 
expert witness Mr. D. Bruce Whited, a licensed surveyor and 
engineer who testified that he "... resurrect[ed] the 
property on paper, and from that I used standard procedures 
to calculate the acreage.11 (R.297.) His opinion was that 
the description contained 33,197 square feet or 0.7605 
acres. (R.299.) 
The RDA called as an expert during their case-in-chief 
Mr. Jay Anderson, a licensed surveyor and engineer who 
testified that by using a computer to do the mathematical 
computations, and by forcing the description to close along 
straight lines, the property contained "... 31,423 square 
feet.,f (R.428.) 
Each side produced aerial photos taken of the property, 
some of recent vintage, others more ancient in origin 
(Exhibits IP, 2P, 3P, 20D and 21D) but neither side had 
accomplished an actual survey of the property prior to 
trial. 
On the final day of trial, Mrs. Jones sought to offer 
as a "rebuttal11 witness, another surveyor and engineer, 
ostensibly to testify that the subject property contained 
"... 36,871.8 square feet." The Court, sua sponte, excused 
the jury and considerable in camera examination occurred by 
the Court of the witness, Mr. Robert Jones, wherein the 
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witness acknowledged that one of his calculations would have 
the property contain "...31,984.8" [square feet] (R.740, 
760), but by "relocating" the property or pushing everything 
to the south by 20 feet or so, the property could be enlarged 
to contain "36,871.8" square feet. The Court refused to 
allow such "unscientific evidence" and considered the same 
totally baseless in that it required an entire realignment 
of extant property lines clearly visable by the aerial 
photos in evidence. Objection was made by the RDA that the 
proffered evidence was not in the nature of "rebuttal 
evidence". (R.753.) 
A plenary trial was held on March 29 through April 3, 
1984, resulting in a verdict of $128,000 as just compensation 
together with $18,300 as reasonable relocation expenses for 
Mrs. Jones. (R.113.) The Trial Court refused to award 
attorney's fees pursuant to UTAH CODE ANNO. § 11-19-23.9 and 
determined that the Jones were not the "prevailing party." 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED UNSUPPORTED 
OPINION TESTIMONY AS TO THE SIZE OF THE SUBJECT 
PROPERTY AND PROPERLY JUDICIALLY NOTED TO THE JURY 
A MATHEMATICAL COMPUTATION AS TO THE POSSIBLE SIZE 
OF SAID PROPERTY. 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT REFUSE TO ALLOW 
EVIDENCE OF PROPER MOVING EXPENSES AS TO APPELLANT 
BUT DID PROPERLY EXCLUDE MOVING COSTS OF NON-
PARTIES (ADULT-EMANCIPATED CHILDREN). 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS 
DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO ALLOW ATTORNEY'S FEES 
AND SUCH AN AWARD WOULD NOT BE PROPER UNDER THE 
RELOCATION ACT. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED UNSUPPORTED 
OPINION TESTIMONY AS TO THE SIZE OF THE SUBJECT 
PROPERTY AND PROPERLY JUDICIALLY NOTED TO THE JURY 
A MATHEMATICAL COMPUTATION AS TO THE POSSIBLE SIZE 
OF SAID PROPERTY. 
Space limitations would not allow a detailed recital of 
the in camera examination by the Court of the basis for the 
proffered "rebuttal" testimony of Mr. Robert Jones found in 
the transcript. (R.737-753.) Suffice it to say that the 
Court found the proffered "opinion" testimony of the expert 
to be "... not supported by scientific count and their 
measurements..." (R.746.) Upon hearing of the Defendant's 
Motion for a New Trial, the Court articulated, in detail, 
the reason and substance for its refusal to allow testimony 
of the nature proffered and for the convenience of the 
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Court, a copy of Judge Wahlquist's specific findings in that 
regard is attached as Appendix "A" hereto. (R.205-212.) 
It is well settled law that testimony in the form of 
opinion which is found by the Court to be unsupported in 
fact or acceptable scientific theory is non-admissible. 
Dixon v^ Stewart, 658 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982) holding that the 
trial court has considerable discretion in determining 
whether expert testimony is admissible; Maltby v. Cox 
Construction Co. 598 P.2d 336 (Utah 1979) wherein the Court 
held that it is largely within the discretion of the trial 
judge to pass on qualifications of an expert witness as to 
whether he [witness] can give sound and reliable help to 
jury; Lamb v\_ Bangart, 525 P.2d 602 (Utah 1974) held that 
the trial court is allowed considerable latitude of discretion 
in admissibility of expert testimony, and in the absence of 
a clear showing of abuse, reviewing court will not reverse; 
Marsh v\_ Irvine, 22 Utah 2d 154, 449 P.2d 996, (1969) held 
that the trial judge should be allowed reasonable latitude 
of discretion both as to necessity for expert testimony and 
as to the qualifications of each witness to give it. See 
also, Fillmore City v\_ Reeve, 571 P.2d 1316 (Utah 1977); 
State Road Commission v^ _ Silliman, 22 Utah 2d 33, 448 P.2d 
347 (1968); Stagmeyer v. Leatham Bros., Inc., 20 Utah 2d 
421, 439 P.2d 279 (1968); Taylor v. Johnson, 18 Utah 2d 16, 
414 P.2d 575 (1966). 
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Moreover, the legal description, albeit imperfect, is 
capable of producing, mathematically, a determination of 
the square footage therein contained. Only flminor adjust-
ment" is required by forcing closure of the description. 
The RDAfs expert put it at 31,423 square feet. Even the 
landowners expert testified: 
A. [Mr. Jones - Surveyor] That [identifying Exhibit 
49-P] was a legal description of what we ascertained 
would be the Jones property within their original 
deed if it were surveyed correctly. 
Q. And how many square feet were in that? 
A. I'm afraid I left it down -- itfs 31,000 some-
thing. Brent, have you got that? I think I left 
it on that sheet. No, excuse me, I have it; 
31,984.8 square feet." (R.760.) 
During the trial, the Court, sua sponte, addressed the 
size of the property in a judicially noticed fact to the 
jury: 
11
 THE COURT: Just a moment. Sometimes the jury is 
instructed to take judicial notice of certain items. 
One of the items which the Court will take judicial 
notice of is as follows: Concerning the size of this 
property, the Court takes judicial notice of the 
general principles of mathematics. If this is calcu-
lated it will end up between 31,000 feet and 32,000 
feet in total. The Court has made this calculation and 
this is true. You must, however, recognize that there 
are some inherent problems in this. This calculation 
is based on the description which is contained in the 
evidence. However, this particular land does not 
close. This is not unusual. It happens occasionally. 
And that is, if you start at one place and you follow 
the exact measurements and then you follow the next --
the curve at 500 so many feet to a certain number 
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of feet, then you go on up straight, and then you come 
back down, there will be a space where •— between the 
two. Do you follow me? This happens sometimes and — 
in other words, descriptions do not always close. It 
indicates that there's some type of minor error somewhere. 
It's 11 -- between 11 and 12 feet off. And it doesn't 
close the description. Closing it the best in some 
type of reasonable fashion could cause a variance of 
some feet this way or that way. It means that someplace 
there's an error out there. But the error would end up 
somewhere so that the land is somewhere between 31,000 
and 32,000 feet. That's the best I can do. 
MR. FOREMASTER: Can Counsel approach the bench, your 
honor? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
(Whereupon a conference was held at the bench.) 
THE COURT: It's probably closer to 32,000 than 31. 
(Whereupon the conference continued.) 
THE COURT: If you can -- because there's an error 
somewhere,, they can cause this assumption of the Court 
to be wrong, then you can recalculate it. But if the 
assumption of the Court is correct, that the curve --
because just the measurement is improper, then that 
would be the measurement. But if the error is in 
someplace else, then it could be different. You may 
proceed. 
MR. HANDY: I think at this time I would interpose an 
objection to the comments of the Court. We had testimony 
from engineers — we'll have testimony from engineersr. 
I think that is what the evidence will be submitted to 
the jury.* 
THE COURT: The Court will take judicial notice of 
normal calculations, like 20 times 20 is 400, and we 
don't leave that to jurors or anyone else. We just do 
it, just as when you calculate — when you make your 
assessment of damages, the assessment will be as of 
February the 28th, but the Court will add the interest 
into that and you won't. In other words, the Court 
makes normal mathematical calculations, not the jury. 
(R.639-642.) 
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While giving a 1,000 square foot deference to the fact 
that the property description is "imperfect", the Court took 
proper judicial notice of mathematical calculations within a 
reasonable range of certainty and about which, because it 
involved only mathematical calculation, no reasonable mind 
could differ. Such is clearly within the recognized province 
of the Court under Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
"RULE 201. JUDICIAL NOTICE OF ADJUDICATIVE FACTS. 
(a) Scope of rule. 
This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudic-
ative facts. 
(b) Kinds of facts. 
A judicially noticed fact must be one not subject 
to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally 
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial 
court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination 
by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably 
be questioned. 
(c) When discretionary. 
A court may take judicial notice, whether requested 
or not. 
(d) When mandatory. 
A court shall take judicial notice if requested by 
a party and supplied with the necessary information. 
(e) Opportunity to be heard. 
A party is entitled upon timely request to an 
opportunity to be heard as to the propriety of taking 
judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed. In 
the absence of prior notification, the request may be 
made after judicial notice has been taken. 
(f) Time of taking notice. 
Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of the 
proceeding. 
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(g) Instructing jury. 
In a civil action or proceeding, the court shall 
instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact 
judicially noticed. In a criminal case, the court 
shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required 
to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed.11 
Mathematical computations are generally of the nature 
described above and are permitted to be judicially noted. 
See, Miller v. Federal Land Bank of Spokane, 587 F.2d 415, 
422 (9th Cir. 1978) wherein the Court judicially noted 
principal and interest calculations and adjustments; Williams 
v. Moran, et al^, 205 F. Supp. 208, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) 
wherein the Court judicially calculated and transposed 
nautical miles to statute miles; Burry v. National Trailer 
Convoy, Inc., 239 F. Supp. 85, 90 (E. D. Tenn. 1963) wherein 
the Court judicially computed distance and time travel in 
minimum wage claims. 
Facts judicially noted can and have been used by our 
Courts to solve property description defects. See, Keller 
v. Chournos Utah 133 P.2d 318 (1943). Geometric 
calculations like those involved in this case are properly 
judicially noted. See, Beams v. Werth, 200 Kan 532, 438 
P.2d 957 (1968). 
One final point wholly negates the Appellants argument 
for reversal on these grounds. The Appellant fails to even 
argue or suggest how the instruction of the Court to the 
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jury had any adverse or negative affect on their case or 
that their "... substantial right ..." was affected as 
required by Rule 103 of Utah Rules of Evidence. Both the 
record and Appellant Brief acknowledge and confirm that the 
issue of "square footage" is really a subterfuge and fiction 
since the landowners case-in-chief included without objection 
or restriction the testimony by their appraisers as to the 
fair market value of the Jones property. Mr. Brown testified 
that the property was worth $215,400 (R.340 - Exhibit 25-D) 
Mr. Heiskanen testified that the property was worth $213,500 
(R.401 - Exhibit 27-D). Both these figures were argued to 
the jury in closing by the Landowners Counsel. (R. 767-68.) 
So, rhetorically, where is the substantial right affected by 
the Court's ruling? Even if erroneous, Judge Wahlquist's 
comments are "harmless error." (See Appendix A, R.211.) 
II. ARGUMENT 
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT REFUSE TO ALLOW EVIDENCE 
OF PROPER MOVING EXPENSES AS TO APPELLANT - BUT 
DID PROPERLY EXCLUDE MOVING COSTS OF NON-PARTIES 
(ADULT-EMANCIPATED CHILDREN). 
Appellant asserts that she was prohibited from seeking 
moving or relocation expenses for her "business", arguendo, 
is a prevarication of the record, either by intent or lapse 
of counsel's memory. 
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Mrs. Jones offered in great detail the moving and 
"relocation" of trailers which she "rented", even though 
such conduct ("business") was not allowed on the property 
and she maintained no business license to so operate. 
Evidence was offered and received as follows: 
1. That Mrs. Jones had to relocate seven trailers. 
(R.473.) 
2. Aztec trucking expense of $2,530 to move the 
double-wide trailer. (R.478.) 
3. Uintah Towing of $75 and $151.25. (R.480.) 
4. Pattys Towing - $150. (R.482.) 
5. United Van Lines - $3,144.86. (R.483.) 
6. Circle R motel expenses for Mrs. Jones and her 
"... children ..." - $467.55. (R.484.) 
7. "Set-up" fees for trailer - $557.71. (R. 485.) 
8. Miscellaneous expenses - $19.73 and $19.55 (R.486.) 
9. Miscellaneous expenses - $38.00 and $21.05. 
(R.487.) 
10. Steam clean carpets - $65.10. (R.487.) 
11. Two telephone hook-ups - business and private -
$178.56. (R.488.) 
12. City permits - $2,097. (R.488.) 
13. Replacement of stolen lawn mowers and T.V. 
antennas - $180. (R.497.) 
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14. Repair to trailers of damage occurring during 
the move - $286.79. (R.498.) 
15. Lost wages - $444. (R.501.) 
All of her expenses were summarized on Exhibit 43-D 
which was offered and received in evidence. 
Mrs. Jones claimed she was in the "business" of renting 
out these trailers, and, in fact, she was allowed to claim 
relocation expenses for moving them and the jury awarded her 
$18,300 as such expenses. 
What was properly excluded was evidence found by the 
Court to be of a duplicitous nature: 
1. For the improvements on the condemned property 
and "replacing" those same improvements on a relocation 
site. 
2. Making "improvements" not originally found at the 
condemned site so that the same did not constitute 
"relocating" expenses. (i.e., adding a basement under 
a trailer.) (R.490, 503.) 
3. Claiming the purchase of a building lot as "relo-
cation" expenses. (R.476-77.) 
The applicable statute is the UTAH CODE ANNO. $ 11-19-
23.9(2) which, in pertinent part, provides as follows: 
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* * ic 
The Court, or jury in cases tried before a jury, may 
also award a reasonable sum as compensation for the 
costs and expenses, if any, of relocating the owner 
whose property is acquired or a party conducting a 
business on such acquired property, An~award may also 
be made for damages to any fixtures or personal property 
owned by the owner of such acquired property or owned 
by the person conducting a business on such acquired 
property, if such fixtures or personal property are 
damaged as a result of such acquisition or relocation. 
What Appellant really complains of is the Court's 
refusal to allow her to claim as relocation expenses the 
costs of relocating trailers which did not belong to her 
but, instead, were owned by her "children". Appellant fails 
to point out to the Court that said "children" are and were, 
in fact, emancipated adults and non-parties to this action 
having no ownership interest in the real estate and not a 
"person or [party] conducting a business on such acquired 
property." as defined in the applicable statute. Two of the 
seven trailers involved turned out to be owned, one each, 
by Mrs. Jones two sons, ages 20 and 23. (R.515-17.) As 
such, Mrs. Jones is in no position to assert or claim 
relocation expenses for property moved which did not belong 
to her and the Court properly excluded such evidence from 
the jury's consideration. See, Rule 17 (a) Rules of Civil 
Procedure - Real Party in Interest and UTAH CODE ANNO. § 15-
2-1 as to length of minority. 
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Said claims rightfully belong to and must be asserted 
by the two adult sons under the Utah Relocation Assistance 
Act, UTAH CODE ANNO. § 57-12-1 e£ se£, and particularly 
§ 57-12-7(1). 
Although no provision is made within the Relocation Act 
for expenses of "children" of a displaced "person", a good 
argument could be made that such family expenses should be 
covered, but that issue is not before the Court under the 
facts of this case. 
III. ARGUMENT 
III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION 
IN REFUSING TO ALLOW ATTORNEY'S FEES AND SUCH AN 
AWARD WOULD NOT BE PROPER UNDER THE RELOCATION 
ACT. 
The trial court was asked by Motion following the jury 
verdict to award attorney's fees to Mr. and Mrs. Jones under 
the UTAH CODE ANNO. § 11-19-23.9 which in pertinent part 
provides as follows: 
"... the Court may, in cases where the amount of 
the award exceeds the amount offered, award in addition 
to his just compensation, costs, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee as determined by the Court." 
Examination of such statute indicates two reasons why 
Appellants claim for attorney's fees was properly denied by 
the Court. 
BRIEF - Page 16 
First, under the statute, the possibility of an award 
of attorney's fees does not arise unless and until "... the 
award exceeds the amount offered..." 
The unrebutted evidence is that the landowners were 
offered, in writing, $150,000 for the subject property. 
(Exhibit 23-D.) Said offer was not broken down on a per 
square foot basis, but was a flat $150,000 for the described 
property - the legal description being included and set 
forth in the offer. Admittedly, the offering price was 
arrived at based on a misunderstanding on the part of the 
RDA. But, nevertheless, it became the "offer" to the 
landowners required by the UTAH CODE ANNO. § 57-12-13(3) and 
could have been accepted at any time prior to trial by the 
landowners. Said offer was never withdrawn, replaced or 
amended and was never accepted by the landowners. Therefore, 
a jury verdict of $128,000 does not "exceed the amount 
offered..." and the condition precedent to invocation of the 
statute has not occurred. 
Secondly, the statute is permissive and not mandatory 
in nature. Even if the "award exceeds the amount offered", 
the Act provides that in such circumstances the Court "may", 
but not "shall", award attorney's fees. Apparently the 
Court didn't feel that the landowners were justified in 
claiming and asserting that the property was worth $215,000 
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when the jury found the property to be worth only $128,000. 
(See Appendix "A" hereto for Judge Wahlquist's findings that 
the landowners were not the "prevailing party11.) Since the 
statute is permissive and not mandatory, the Courtfs discretion 
should not be altered or set aside by this Court unless such 
discretion was exercised arbitrarily. 
Since the rule allows the trial court discretion in 
this matter, this Court will not and should not reverse that 
order unless it is clearly shown that the trial court abused 
that discretion. It is this Court's policy to accord great 
deference to discretionary conclusions of the trial court 
regarding attorney fees. Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley 
Dairy Ass'n., 657 P.2d 1279 (Utah 1982); an award of attorney 
fees is within the sound discretion of the trial court and 
will not be overturned in absence of showing of clear abuse, 
Sears v^ Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1982); or finally, 
in the absence of a showing of patent error or clear abuse 
of discretion in an award of attorney fees, this Court will 
not disturb the judgment of the trial court, Alexander v. 
Brown, 646 P.2d 692 (Utah 1982). 
CONCLUSION 
The trial judge properly exercised his discretion in 
regards to the proffered testimony of Mr. Robert Jones, 
engineer, and excluded said testimony. The Court also 
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properly took judicial notice of the principles of calculus 
and facts commonly within the knowledge of the community 
regarding the property lines and properly instructed the 
jury as to the size limitations of the subject property. 
Appellant does not show a clear abuse of that discretion. 
Appellant is not the real party in interest to claim 
relocation expenses for her emancipated adult sons, and she 
was not prohibited from claiming all legitimate, non-duplic-
itous business relocation expenses. 
The trial judge properly denied an award of attorney 
fees since the Appellant did not recover more than the 
amount offered by the RDA and such determination is a matter 
of discretion with the trial court not reversible where 
there has been no showing of abuse of said discretion. 
The judgment on the verdict and the denial of an award 
of attorney fees should and must be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of August, 1985. 
Harold A. Hintze 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondem 
2230 University Parkway 
Suite 9E 
Provo, Utah 84604 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and 
correct copies of the BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to Phillip 
L. Foremaster, Attorney for Appellant, 165 North 100 East, 
Suite 1, P. 0. Box 572, St. George, Utah 84770. 
DATED this j d~ day of August, 1985. 
JUL 
ujfig, S^cr Debbie YoujAg, Secretary 
APPENDIX "A" 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE ^ OF tJTAH 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF 
ROYf a public agency, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KEITH S. JONES and 
LORIS M. JONES, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF COURTfS 
RULING 
Case No. 84431 
Defense attorney is invited to submit documents for the 
Court's signature consistent with that indicated below. The 
verdict stands. 
THE SIZE OF THE AREA TAKEN 
Neither side surveyed the area in question in anticipa-
tion of this litigation. To conduct such a survey after the 
litigation was under way would have presented great difficulties. 
By that time, the land and all adjoining lands had been distri-
buted so that the natural markings were gone. The natural 
markings are, howeverf reflected in the aerial photographs that 
have been presented by both sidesf and also some of the other 
photographs. The area is also a part of a well-known landmark. 
Many of the members of the jury will have the same type of 
community recall concerning this area that the Court has. The 
Court's memory goes back more than 50 years, and recalls that at 
that time the area involved the main road from Ogden to Salt 
Lake. The first viadock constructed over the extensive railroad 
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tracks west of Ogden was what was known as 24th Street. This 
came out of the middle of Ogden and proceeded due west over the 
tracks, and permited traffic to flow over the tracks, and then 
head off in a southwest direction toward a highway, which runs 
almost north and south on up through Roy, north to Brigham City, 
and south towards Salt Lake. Eventually a new viadock was 
constructed over the tracks in Riverdale. This changed the main 
route from Ogden to Salt Lake to be along Riverdale Road, until 
it reached what was called "Death's Curve", which is the area 
here in question, and then proceeded south to Salt Lake. Since 
that time other roads, such as the one along the foot of the 
mountains and the freeway, have been built just slightly to the 
east of the area in question. Death's Curve was well-known and 
its location probably rivaled in importance in local conversation 
to the actual existence of the City of Roy itself. The new road 
which brought Death's Curve into existence, actually by passed 
Riverdale, as it was then known and has created a new Riverdale. 
The junction of Riverdale Road and the main road to Salt 
Lake and Death's Curve was almost a right angle. As time passed, 
highways were widened, construction work was done to allow for 
merging traffic lanes, islands, stop signs, etc., and all that 
changed the appearance of major intersections, including this 
one. The change was a gradual one, and has been done many 
times. The effect has changed what was almost a right-hand turn 
if a person drove north from Roy to Ogden and turned on Riverdale 
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Road into what is today a slow, rounding turnf which is not 
effected by stop lights. Out in front of the property to the 
north would be the islands which separate and divide the roads 
and shape the patterns of traffic. Part of the difficulty 
presented today in measuring the true size of this land is 
contained in the fact that the manner in which it was surveyed 
and described is unusual. What would normally be regarded as 
both the north line and the west line is actually not described 
in the deeds, except to indicate that it is along the road. Of 
course the road has changed from a right angle to a long curve. 
Undoubtedly when it changed this way, actual volume of the 
property in question was lessened. This situation is further 
clouded by the fact that what is a south line, a line that runs 
virtually true east and west, is one of those lines described as 
both more or less, the boundary that might be described as the 
east boundary of the property, is broken in the middle by an 
angle so that it goes off slightly over 30 degrees to the west 
after it moves up approximately one-half the distance from the 
south line to the north line. This problem is further compli-
cated by the fact that the last portion of the east line is also 
described as "more or less" to the road. In the early photo-
graphs, particularly the aerial ones, it can be immediately noted 
that the south line and the east line are boundaries of an area 
that had been settled for more than one-half a century. The 
lines not only tie in such as this property tied to the property 
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to the south and was indicated by a fence, but also the fence 
extends on and ties onto other lands and other developments. To 
a limited extent this is true of the east line. Clearly it was a 
separation between this property and the property to the east. 
ihe measurements that have to be relied upon in law are 
fairly well defined insofar as the south line is concerned. It 
can be determined by measuring things across the street, and also 
such measurements tie into other adjoining properties, and can be 
reasonably located. The line on the east is more difficult to 
locate today, but can be located clearly on ancient aerial photo-
graphs. The problem is somewhat further complicated by different 
measurements are anchored to different monuments. Some measure-
ments are anchored to the monuments to the southwest, and others 
are measured from monuments on the southeast. Regardless of all 
the difficulties which are presented, it is clear from the aerial 
photographs and the testimony here given that there was a clear 
understanding of those involved, and acceptance of markings that 
were in the form of fence lines, etc., which coincided very 
closely to the descriptions. The Court finds that there cannot 
be a reasonable difference of opinion as to where the south line 
is or was. The Court also finds that the measurements today 
would indicate that the length of the line is very close to that 
indicated. A portion of the east boundary is also clearly 
locatable. The overall difficulty is that if you construct a map 
to scale and rely on the southwest monument for those measure-
ments, and the eastern monument for its measurements, then you 
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accept the distances called for as exactly as they are called for 
and ignoring the "more or less" line, and then for the north and 
the west you accept the public documents which describe the 
location of the road, you come out with property which is 31,400 
square feet in size. This figure can be debated very slightly, 
because it is possible to not quite have the description close. 
The Court has considered the hypothesis suggested by the land-
owners, which would raise the size of the property up to 34,000 
square feet and finds it to be totally unwarranted. To accept 
this hypothsis would be to ignore what was reflected on the 
ground as fence lines, etc. The Court has invited the parties to 
make what surveys could be made today to try to solve this 
problem, but absent any new evidence, the Court concludes that as 
a matter of law and reasonable minds cannot differ, and the 
property cannot be larger than 32,000. The Court recognizes 
that, in making its calculations, it is plagued by certain diffi-
culties and suggestions. One of the difficulties has to do wih 
the line description of the road contained in the public docu-
ments. The southwestern portion of the line is described as a 
part of an arc of a circle that had a radius of more than 500 
feet. The projected location of such a radius would indicate 
clearly that there has never been any measurement of it. It 
would be over some fences and intersect some buildings, in the 
course of which extend almost a city block. What this appears to 
be is one of two things. It is a use of a angle turn that the 
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Court has seen in road construction. An arc of that size is 
fairly frequently seen in road construction as desirable for 
traffic purposes. Secondly, it could be some engineer's estimate 
who is familiar with such problems as he cited and measured with 
the naked eye, and made up a description reasonably close. If 
this entire roadside line was expanded one way or the other ten 
feet, it would still yield a total volume of between 31,000 and 
32,000 square feet. The landowners have been given the advantage 
of the figure of 32,000 square feet. 
Modern rules of evidence require that the Court take 
judicial notice of the principles of science. If the Court were 
to simply turn its back on the problem in this case and permit 
various parties to indulge in unwarranted assumptions and guesses 
as to the size of the land, the Court would be abandoning its 
responsibility to operating in as scientific a frame as is prac-
ticable. The Court concludes that absent some new survey that 
would clearly indicate otherwise, the Court's instruction that 
the jurors consider that the property was approximately 32,000 
square feet is as generous as is logical in the situation. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES 
The issue of attorney's fees as it is written in the new 
statutes which makes it discretionary if the Court desires to 
grant to a property owner attorney's fees if the property owner 
has been dealt unfairly or erroneously with by a condeming 
agency. The statute provides that if a property owner secures a 
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judgment larger than that which he was offered, the Court should 
consider the awarding of such fees. In this particular case 
there is no question but that before this litigation started, the 
landowners were offered $150,000, which is more than they 
received from the jury's verdict. Per se they could not be 
regarded as the prevailing party in any sense. The argument of 
the landowners goes as follows: when the land was thought to be 
much larger than it was, and the offer was made for $150,000, 
that that equaled approximately $3.50 per square foot for their 
land. When the property was shown to be much smaller than was 
originally thought, that if you divide the 32,000 square feet 
into the total amount of the award, the figure per square foot is 
now greater than it would have been granted by the offer. If 
this were a total summary of the situation, the Court would feel 
that the landowners had an issue, but the Court concludes that 
that is not the case. While land in commercial areas frequently 
sold by and referred to as sale per square feet, but the true 
price is much more calculatable, in a commercial area by the 
exposure to view, access to various directions, and traffic 
flows, etc. These types of considerations can change the square 
foot value of the property by multiples as high as four or five. 
It is unlikely that any purchaser of this land in question would 
ever be interested in the exact square footage that just happens 
to be there. It is much more likely that the value and the sales 
price would be arranged after a general consideration of the size 
211 
Page 8 
Memorandum Decision 
Case No. 84431 
of the area, and the determination as to whether or not it is 
adequate for the purpose intended, but the big attention would be 
on factors such as exposure, accessabilityf and traffic flows. 
The Court concludes that the Joneses are not the prevailing party 
in this action and should not be awarded attorney's fees. 
DATED this *V day of Junef 1984. 
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